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IN THR SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, by .and through 
Director Assistance Payment 
Administration, Utah State 
Department of Social Service, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
-v-
LESTER ROMERO, a/k/a 
RALPH G. ROMERO I 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Supreme Court No. 16551 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by the State of Utah against 
the Defendant to recover public assistance payments fraudulently 
obtained by the Defendant. 
DISPOSITION IN LONER COURT 
This case was heard by the trial court on its merits and 
the lower court granted judgment in favor of the plaintiff in 
the amount of $11,981.21 with costs. (R.49). The trial court 
held that the judgment represented public assistance which the 
Defendant had fraudulently obtained by supplying false information 
to the State and by withholding material information with the 
intent to obtain public assistance to which he was not entitled. 
(R.49,50). 
-1-
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent, State of Utah, seeks an affirmance of the 
trail court's decision. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Appellant applied for public assistance on February 
11, 1969, and began to receive public assistance intermit-
tently from February, 1969 through November, 1973. The total 
amount of public assistance paid by the State to the Appellant 
was Eleven Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty-one and 21/100 Dollars 
($11' 981. 21) . 
The State discontinued the assistance oayments to 
Appellant when it had gathered evidence indicating that Appel-
lant had made several misrepresentations on his application 
forms. The alleged misrepresentations included Appellant's 
annual income, his employment, his real ?roperty owned and 
transferred, and his wife's employment. As a result of the 
alleged misrepresentations, an attorney for the State, who is 
no longer employed by the State of Utah, filed a complaint to 
recover the assistance from Appellant on January 11, 1974. 
(R. 2-3). 
I 
On April 5, 1974, the Appellant filed several discovery! 
requests (R.6-l5), and on July 18, 1978, an attorney for 
Respondent newly assigned to this matter answered the discovery 
requests. (R.23-3l). Throughout the discovery period and 
during the trial of this case on its merits, Appellant never 
once raised the issue of Respondents delay in answering the 
-2- j 
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discovery requests and never requested that this case be set 
for trial. Thus, on September 15, 1978, Respondent reauested 
a trial setting for this matter. (R.32). 
On May 22, 1979, a pre-trial conference was held before 
Judge G. Hal Taylor, who concluded that no further continuance 
of this case would be granted unless a judge was not available, 
and that the defendant had sufficient notice of trial to (1) 
be ready to proceed, and (2) either have an attorney or be 
prepared to proceed pro se. (R.36). On June 13, 1979, the 
trial of this case on its merits was begun notwithstanding 
Appellant's request for a continuance, for the first time, on 
the morning of trial, in Judge Conder's chambers, the Defendant 
asked the court to dismiss the case for failure to prosecute 
and for laches. (R.79,84). The trial of this case was concluded 
on June 15, 1979 with the court ruling in favor of Respondent 
and granting judgment for Respondent in the amount of ~11,981.21 
plus costs. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT'S ARGUM~NTS THAT ~~RE NOT RAISED IN THE 
PLEADINGS NOR PUT IN ISSUE AT THE TRIAL CANNOT BE 
CONSIDERED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. 
Arguments one through three of the Appellant's brief 
are now being presented to this court for the first time on appeal. 
These issues, the basis of Appellant's arguments, were never 
put in issue in any form through pleadinas, motion, or at trial. 
These arguments are therefore improperly before this court and 
are not to be considered. The Utah Supreme Court has been 
_,_ 
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consistent in stating over the years that: "matters neither rai 
in the pleadings nor put in issue at trial cannot be considered 
for the first time on appeal." Wagner v. Olsen, 25 Utah 2d 
366, 482 P.2d 702, 704 (1971). See also , Park City Utah Corp. 
Ensign Co., 586 P.2d 450 (1978), Edgar v. Wagner, 572 P.2d 405 
and others to numerous to cite. 
The main basis for this confirmed position of the court 
is that the Supreme Court's jurisdiction with the exception of 
extraordinary writs, is apPellate only. State v. Kinder, 14 Uta' 
2d 199, 381 P.2d 82 (1963); and Utah Const. art. VIII §4. 
Regarding this position, this court has said: 
"The essential criterion of 'appellate 
jurisdiction' is that it revises and corrects 
the proceedings in a cause already instituted 
and does not create that cause. In reference 
to judicial tribunals, an appellate jurisdiction, 
therefore, necessarily implies that the subject-
matter has been already instituted in an acted 
upon by some other court, whose judgment or 
proceedings are to be revised ... The jurisdic-
tion to consider and decide causes de novo is in 
its essence 'original jurisdiction." State v. 
Johnson, 100 Utah 316, 114 P.2d 1034, 1037 (1941). 
Thus, the trial court's purpose is to frame the issues: 
and render a decision on appropriate evidence presented to it, 
1 
while the appellate court's purpose is to review those matters! 
I 
which the trial court has already decided and rul~d on and 
not rule on matters not raised at the lower level. 
If this Court was to consider the Apcellant's first j 
three arguments, it would be assuming original jurisdiction ir. 
present case. In other words, the Supreme Court would be decUl 
issues that were never acted on nor decided bv the District ~-
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Such a position by the Court would place in jeopardy the 
District court's jurisdiction in civil matters, and the right 
to have matters tried by the lower court. To preserve this 
jurisdiction, and to ensure that matters are raised in the 
lower court where they should be, the Utah Supreme Court has 
stated in Park City Utah Corp. v. Ensign Co., 586 P.2d 446, 450 
(1978). 
"Where a party neither raises an issue in its 
pleadings nor presents it to the trial court, 
the issue cannot be considered for the first 
time on appeal." 
Respondents would further like to point out to the 
court that parties cannot lead or allow the trial court to error 
at the trial level, and then if a satisfactory result is not 
achieved, raise these new matters on appeal if they were not 
to their liking below. Respondents do not believe there was 
error, but even if it could be so construed, feel that the 
Utah Supreme court has spoken: In Ludlow v. Colbrado Animal 
By-Products Co. 104 Utah 221, 137 P.2d 347 (1943), the court 
stated: 
"A party who takes a position which either 
leads a court into error or by conduct 
approves the error committed by the court, 
cannot later take advantage of such error in 
procedure .• 
It is clear from the entire record, that the conduct of 
Appellant allowed, consented, or acquiesed in the actions of the 
court -- moving ahead and holding trial on the issues --
without saying anythinq bv wav of ob-iection. To declare now 
that Appellant's claims are valid and that error existed is 
an "after-the-fact" argument which must be rejected as Leing 
without basis. This "after thought" approach claims "prejudice," 
-5-
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when in fact no such prejudice existed or has been shown. 
POINT II 
SINCE NO MOTION NAS "1ADE AT THE TRIAL LEVEL 
CONCERNING RESPONDENT'S DISCOVERY ANSWERS, THE 
TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING THIS CASE 
TO BE TRIED ON ITS ~£RITS. 
Appellant contends that this case should have been 
dismissed by thebwer court because of the delay of filing 
Appellant's answers to the discovery requests. Sanctions 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are not self-executing 
and never have been. The contention of Appellant that the 
trial judge should have dismissed this case without any motion 
being made by Appellant is not substantiated or sound. If such 
were allowed or ruled the correct procedure of this court, the 
trial judges would then be placed in a position that would rew 
trial judges to be a third advocate, and to become judicially 
active in each case, thus changing the nature of actions from 
that of "Plaintiff vs Defendant" to an unwritten third party 
situation of "Court vs. Plaintiff and Plaintiff vs. Defendant 
and Court vs. Defendant." 
Respondent agrees that there are perhaps those cases 
I 
where the court on its own may find the situation such that in·' 
dependent rulings are made. But such is not, or has it ever 
been the rule. Such is, if anything, in the discretion oft~ 
trial court. In the instant case, the trial court exercised 
its discretion to proceed. No objection to the exercise of 
discretion was raised belm·?. Since the sanctions of the rule' 
I 
are not self executing and since there has been no showino or 1 
allegation that the court abused the discretion, the trial cc:·i 
-k-
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must be sustained. 
Respondent deems it important, however, to point out 
to the court that none of the cases cited by Appellant involve 
"self executing" rules. In each instance motions were brought 
before the court for rulings. For example, in Schmitt v. Billings, 
et.al., No. 16084 (Utah, filed August 24, 1979) cited by Appellant), 
the Plaintiff filed a summary judqment at the trial level to have 
the requests for admission admitted when the defendant failed 
to answer. And in W.B. Gardner Inc. v. Park West Village, Inc., 
568 P.2d 734 (1977) (cited by Appellant), the pla2ntiff filed a 
motion for summary judqment and a motion for default judgment with 
the trial court when the defendant did not respond to the 
discovery requests. 
Counsel for Respondent is involved with a separate case 
now when he filed reouests for Admissions and Interrogatories 
over six months ago, and because other counsel had problems 
getting information, allowed the answers and admissions to be 
filed without further notice to the court. To say that the 
present filing of those documents is a futile exercise and 
disallowed is an injustice to the party. There are always two 
sides to the issues before the court. If one partv acouiesces in 
the extensions or delavs of the other oarty, then it can be assumed, 
and in fact must be accepted, that he is allowing extra time to 
see that proper information is forthcoming and that the trial 
should go on. If he thinks otherwise, the avenues 6f bringing 
the matter before the court for determination are as much a 
reality for one party as well as another. Appellant has no one 
-7- I 
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to complain to but himself for his action or lack of action. 
In the cases cited by Appe~lant, the trial judge did 
not rule on the failure of one to respond to discovery reouests 
until a motion was made by a party to the action. That is not 
so here. Since no motion was made at the trial£vel by the 
Appellant to impose the sanctions of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the trial court did not err in permitting this 
case to be tried on its merits. At such trial level, 
at least, Respondent would have been able to present its side. 
It, not being part of this record is not relevant to the actim 
here, but answers were timely prepared and signed and apparent! 
filed in 1974, but when counsel who presently handles the case 
took over in 1978, learned they were not part of the record~ 
resubmitted them bearing the 1978 date. If such information ho 
been presented to the trial court in response to appropriate 
motion of Appellant, the trial court would still have had his I 
discretion to rule. Since that had not happened here, Appelk 
is attempting to have this court make a decision without the ~~ 
opportunity of learning the facts. Such a oosition should be 
rejected. 
POINT III 
ALTHOUGH THERE WAS A DELAY IN ANSWERING APPELLANT'S 
DISCOVERY REQUESTS, THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT :SRR 
IN PER!-HTTING THE PRESENT CASE TO BE TRIED ON ITS 
MERITS. 
Even if there is supoort for ~opellant's position 
that the trial judge should have dismissed this case without 
a motion, such a decision would still be in the discretion c: 
the trial judge. _I The Utah Supreme Court stated the follo'-''lf, 
-8-
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when discussing the sanctions of Rule 37 of the U.R.C.P.: 
"The language of the rule as presently worded 
is permissive, rather than mandatory, wherein it 
states: that the court ' ... may make such orders ..• 
as are just, and ... may take any action etc.' 
This grants the court discretionary authority 
to impose the sanctions mentioned." (Carmen v. 
Slavens, 546 P.2d 601, 603 (Utah 1976); see also 
U.R.C.P. Rule 37(d). Emphasis Added). 
Thus, the trial judge in using his discretion could have decided 
that it was just to allow this case to go to trial for any of the 
following reasons; (1) No motion was made by Appellant for 
dismissal on discovery grounds, (2) Appellant had eleven months 
to prepare his case for trial after the answers to the discovery 
requests were filed, (3) When the case finally went to trial 
Appellant was still not ready to defend himself, and (4) the 
trial judge could be following the Utah Supreme Courts' "consistent 
po~_icy of resolving doubts in favor of permitting parties to 
have their day in court on the merits of che controversy." 
Ruffinengo v. Miller, 579 P.2d 342, 344 (Utah 1978); see also 
Carmen v. Slavens, 546 P.2d 501 (Utah 1976). 
For whatever reason the trial judge had in allowing this 
case to go to trial, his decision was based on having all the 
circumstances of the case close at hand. This court has stated 
the following when a decision is left to the judge's discretion; 
"In situations where the exercise of discretion is 
appropriate, considerable weight should be given to 
the determination of the trial court, whichever way it 
goes. This is true because due to his close involve-
ment with the Parties, the witnesses, and the total cir-
cumstances of the case, he is in the best position to 
judge what the interests of justice reauire in safe-
guarding the rights and interests of all parties 
concerned." Barber v. Calder, 522, P.2d 700,702(Utah 1974). 
-9-
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The trial judge was in the best position to decide whether this 
case should go to trial, and he decided that justice would best 
be served by allowing the parties to have their day in court. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ERR IN DENYING APPELLANT'S 
REQUEST FOR DISMISSAL OF THIS CASE ON THE GROUND 
OF FAILURE TO PROSECUTE. 
When a trial judge has decided to grant or deny a 
motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute, this court has stu 
that it will not reverse the lower court's rulinq except for 
abuse of discretion, to wit, that it is arbitrary, capricious, 
or not based on adeauate findings of fact or on law. Pacer v. 
Myers, 534 P.2d 616, 617 (Utah 1975). 
The lower court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Appellant's reguest for failure to prosecute because when the 
motion was brought Respondent was diligently prosecuting this 
action. 2 AM JUR. 2d §59 at page 51 states as follows: 
"A motion to dismiss for want of prosecution 
should not be granted if at the time of the 
motion Plaintiff is diligently prosecuting his 
claim, even though at some prior period of time he 
had been guilty of gross negligence or neglect." 
Appellant's reguest for failure to prosecute was not brought 
until the first day of trial, at that time Responder,t was 
diligently pursuing this action. 
' In discussing whether a motion for failure to prosecu:·
1 
should be granted this court has stated the followinq; 
"It is indeed commendable to handle cases 
with dispatch and to move calendars with 
expedition in order to keep them UP to date. 
But it is even more important to keep in 
mind that the verv rea~on for the existence 
of courts is to a~fo~d disPutants an oPoortuhity 
-10-
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to be heard and to do justice between them. 
In conformity with that principle the courts 
generally tend to favor granting relief from 
default judgments where there is any reasonable 
excuse, unless it will result in substantial 
prejudice or injustice to the adverse party." 
(Emphasis added). 
Westinghouse El. Sup. Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Con., Inc., 544 P.2d 
876, (Utah 1975). This court further stated in li-7estinqhouse, id, 
at page 879 that: 
"Whether there is such justifiable excuse is to 
be tletermined by considering more factors ~
1.1erelv the lenqth of time since the suit was 
flled. Some consideration should be given to the 
conduct of both parties, and to the opportunitv 
each has had to move the case forward and what 
they have done about it; and also what difficulty or 
prejudice may have been caused to the other side; 
and most important, whether injustice may result from 
the dismissal." (Emphasis added). 
Numerous other cases, which will not be cited, also 
reiterate that time is only one factor out of many. 
Accordingly, the length of time since the filing of the 
suit is insufficient for reversal of the entire matter. Action 
had been taking place one year before trial up to trial itself-
that is prosecuting an action. In applying the other factors 
it is evident that the delay in prosecuting this case is 
reasonably excusable in light of the various counsel that 
plaintiff has had on the case, the complexity of the case, and 
that had Appellant been anxious to proceed he could have taken 
such affirmative steos himself, or file appropriate motions when 
counsel was not acting. 
-11-
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POINT V 
APPELLANT'S REQUEST TO DISMISS BECAUSE OF LACHES 
WAS CORRECTLY DENIED BY THE TRIAL JUDGE 
In matters concerning laches this court has stated 
the following: 
"The existence of laches is one to be determined 
primarily by the trial court; and reviewing courts will 
not interfere with the exercise of the trial court's 
discretion in the matter, unless it appears that a 
manifest injustice has been done, o:r tr.e decision canna 
reasonably be found to be sul-'}'orted by the 2vidence." 
Papanikol"as Brothers Enterorises v. Sugarhouse Sh"ooping 
Center Associates, 535 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1975) 
In the present case the trial judge did not abuse his discret~ 
in denying Appellant's recruest for dismissal on laches, because 
the prejudices complained of by Appellant were all created by 
Appellant's unpreparedness and not by the delay. For example, 
in the present case the Respondent never gave notice to Defend< 
that this case was not being diligently prosecuted. In fact, I 
Appellant knew 11 months before trial that pleadings were 
being filed, 9 months prior to trial that his counsel had / 
withdrew, 8 months prior to trial when the trial date was sche:) 
I 
5 weeks before that a pre-trial was scheduled, 3 weeks before ~ 
at pretrial that Appellant would be reouired to be prepared 
because no continuances would be allowed. However, on the dad 
of the trial Appellant had neither prepared himself nor had~~ 
obtained counsel. This was not the results of anything ResP~ 
had done. In fact it is obvious on page 2 of the trial trans·: 
I 
cript (R.79). Appellant states: "Mr. Barker, I went into hi5 / 
office to find the file. He says it's in his inactive file 
had been searching three days ... " The fact that onl\" three 
or even a few days before, is when Appellant took this matter 
.................... --------------~-12-
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seriously is not the fault of Respondent. If a party himself 
delays his own preparedness after knowing the schedule of upcoming 
motions, or trials, the party so prepared should and must not 
be punish~d or prejudiced by the one not prepared. Based on 
this record, the court properly denied Appellants motion for 
a continuance. Only after this did Appellant try to have this 
case dismissed for laches. This, the court appropriately denied. 
If the Appellant had truly wanted to ore~ent the prejudices 
mentioned he could have procured counsel, taken affirmative 
steps to move the case forward, or at the very least reviewed 
the file kept by his attorney who had withdrawn 8 months prior 
to trial. None of these steps were taken by the Appellant, 
and thus the only thing left which Appellant could complain 
of was the length of the delay. However, for ourposes of finding 
laches applicable to bar an action, mere passage of time does not 
amount to the required prejudice. Leon v. Byns, 115 Ariz. 
451, 565 P.2d 1312 (1977); see also Darby v. Keeran, 211 Kan. 
133, 505 P. 2d 710 (19 73) ; Leathers v. Commercial Nat' 1 Bank 
in Muskogee, 410 P. 2d 541 {Oklahoma, 1966). 
Therefore, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion 
when he denied Appellant's reauest for dismissal on laches; 
because there was amole evidence to show that the injustice 
complained of by Appellant was inflicted upon him by himself 
and not by the delay. Appropriate and timely steps taken by 
the appellant himself would have solved his own problems. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Appellant misrepresented on his public assistance 
application forms essential inofrmation which is used to deter-
mine eligibility. As a result of these misrepresentations, 
Appellant obatined a substantial sum of money that he was not 
entitled to receive. A great injustice would occur to the State· 
if Appellant, who perpetrated his fraud, is allowed to retain 
these funds. 
The arguments raised by Appellant for dismissing this I 
action have nothing to do with whether or not he cornrni tted fraud. 
The arguments Appellant raises on appeal deal only with the I 
period of time between the filing of the complaint and the date~~ 
this action was tried on its merits. i 
Appellant's first three arguments concerning the answeri!· 
of discovery requests, are nov> being raised for the first time 
on appeal. This court should not consider these arguments 
because they were never raised in nor ruled upon by the trial 
court. Nonetheless, the court did not abuse its discretion, 
the san-ctions are not self executing, and the matter was proper!~ 
allowed to proceed. 
On the other hand, even if the trial ludae can invoke 
the sanctions of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on his own 
I 
I 
motion as Appellant contends, he chose not to do so after revi4 
the record. This argument as well as arguments of failure to 
prosecute and laches are understood to be exerciseable "in t~ 
discretion of the trial court." The trial judge did not abuse 
his discretion by allowing this case to be tried on its merits-
I 
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Appellant does not cite any abuse or try to substantiate abuse 
except citing delay of Respondent. The court had ample evidence 
to determine that the Appellant was in no particular hurry in 
getting the pretrial discovery procedures completed, getting 
on with trial, or even moving the court for relief prior to 
trial. Thus, the lower court, as the trier of fact, was in a 
position to properly see the issues and evidence and ruled 
properly in all aspects of this case. 
The judgment for $11,981.21 plus costs should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
ROBERT B. ~~SEN 
Attorney General, 
STEPHEN G. SCHWENDIMAN 
Assistant Attorney General 
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